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Abstract
Deliberative democracy grounds its legitimacy largely in the ability of speakers to
participate on equal terms. Yet theorists and practitioners have struggled with how to establish
deliberative equality in the face of stark differences of power in liberal democracies. Designers
of innovative civic forums for deliberation often aim to neutralize inequities among participants
through proportional inclusion of disempowered speakers and discourses. In contrast, others
argue that democratic equality is best achieved when disempowered groups deliberate in their
own enclaves (interest groups, parties, and movements) before entering the broader public
sphere. Borrowing from each perspective, we argue that there are strong reasons to incorporate
enclave deliberation among the disempowered within civic forums. We support this claim by
presenting case study evidence showing that participants in such forums can gain some of the
same benefits of deliberation found in more heterogeneous groups (such as political knowledge,
efficacy and trust), can consider a diversity of viewpoints rather than falling into groupthink and
polarization, and can persuade external stakeholders of the legitimacy of the group’s
deliberations.
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Introduction
The struggle to balance the voices of lay citizens with the voices of experts and elites has
always been a feature of deliberative democracy. In classical Athens, professional rhetors with
greater education and knowledge of politics took the most active role in addressing the citizen
Assembly.1 In the New England town meetings of the 1700s, achieving consensus often
depended upon discounting the interests of those with the least status and trusting the judgment
of “the kinds of men who had always held power in the town.”2 And, of course, most
community members were denied standing as citizens and excluded from these deliberative
bodies entirely.
Over the past two decades, revived interest in the theory and practice of deliberation has
been driven in part by a concern for achieving discursive equality in diverse and stratified
societies. Deliberation fulfills its special claims to democratic legitimacy when it focuses
participants on decision-making based on how well they justify their views to one another rather
than on participants’ “authority, status, numbers, money, or muscle”: “Decisions resulting from
deliberation may be more fair and legitimate because they result from reasons rather than
arbitrary advantages. They may be wiser because they allow a broad range of perspectives and
information to be pooled together.”3 Despite their differences, some of the initial and most
influential theories of deliberation have argued that deliberation among equals can occur if we
privilege rational discourse over other forms of communication, require participants to orient
arguments toward the common good rather than private or group interests, and prioritize arriving
at some form of consensus rather than majority rule.4
However, this initial phase of the “deliberative turn” in political theory has been widely
criticized for perpetuating rather than resolving the problem of inequality. Critics contend that
“the demands for reason, consensus, and the common good may marginalize or exclude
members of disadvantaged groups.”5 A vision of rational discourse in which speakers must give
logical reasons and evidence for their positions favors “the talk of an identifiable and privileged
sector” trained to engage in this kind of discourse.6 Considerable evidence from experimental
psychology and traditional deliberative settings (such as juries and public hearings) suggests that
those with more education and higher status speak more frequently and that “the vast gap
between elite and citizen expertise is likely to make elites far more influential than citizens” in
such contexts.7 In addition, insistence on consensus can suppress discussion of difficult
differences in ways that “narrow the possible agenda for deliberation and thereby effectively
silence some points of view,” especially the values and interests of the marginalized.8 Exclusive
consideration of the common good can also be a subtle means of domination because
“definitions of the common good are likely to express the interests and perspectives of the
dominant groups in generalized terms.”9
In response to these criticisms, many deliberative scholars have incorporated concerns
about inequality into the theory of deliberative democracy. Following Young and Sanders, some
have adopted a broader notion of rationality that includes greater appreciation of the role of
emotion, storytelling, and rhetoric as valuable elements of civic reasoning.10 Others have
leavened the desire for consensus with an appreciation for productive disagreement that
encourages participants to explore their differences and allows room for negotiating them or
putting them to a majority vote.11 Some empirical evidence finds that contestation and
disagreement can improve the quality of deliberation, for example by increasing the number of
reasons citizens are able to generate for different positions, especially reasons why others might
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have differing opinions.12 Others have rethought whether deliberation must always be oriented
toward the common good, accepting that the “articulation of self-interest [has] a legitimate role
in democratic deliberation, particularly in discussions of fair distribution.”13 Chambers offers a
revised definition of deliberation that reflects many of these changes in thinking:
We can say that deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable,
well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of
discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Although
consensus need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to
pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood
as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation.14
A host of new civic forums that are increasingly informing and influencing public policy
offer promising places for this kind of deliberation. These forums include deliberative polls,
consensus conferences, planning cells, citizens juries, 21st century town meetings, citizens
assemblies, and participatory budgeting.15 Despite their different designs, these civic forums all
create “minipublics”16 – structured deliberations among microcosms of the public that generate
recommendations, monitor government, and sometimes contribute directly to enacting policy. In
the past decade, these forums have helped shape many policy processes, including the state of
Oregon’s healthcare reforms, the annual budgets of several Latin American cities, a proposal for
electoral reform in British Columbia, Chicago’s community policing and school boards, the
redevelopment plans for the former World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan, and Danish
regulations on genetically modified foods. To address potential inequalities, organizers of such
forums have paid much attention to putting control over the selection of participants, framing of
issues, structure of agendas, and definition of the goals of deliberation in the hands of
intermediaries with no stake in the outcome, or multi-partisan groups that provide checks and
balances on competing interests, or a mixture of both kinds of entities. These forums also
employ a wide array of procedural safeguards for ensuring that all can participate freely and
equally in deliberation, including rules for discussion and moderators trained in eliciting
participation from all and in minimizing domination by particular participants or ways of
speaking.17 Several studies suggest that well-designed forums can succeed at diminishing
patterns of inequality in participation and influence over public deliberation.18
Still, some theorists have argued that boosting equality depends not simply on including
disempowered groups in cross-cutting discussion with more privileged citizens and powerful
institutions, but also on the ability of the marginalized to confer among themselves in their own
social movement organizations, interest groups, or parties. In this view, the disempowered need
to be able to “oscillate between protected enclaves, in which they can explore their ideas in an
environment of mutual encouragement, and more hostile but also broader surroundings in which
they can test those ideas against the reigning reality.”19 Yet most of the innovative civic forums
we have mentioned follow a process of inclusion of the marginalized within a random sample or
quasi-representative microcosm of the public as a whole.20
In this article we propose the incorporation of spaces for enclave deliberation for the
disempowered within civic forums. We argue why such a move could enhance the overall
quality and equality of deliberative democracy in ways that deliberative theory and practice has
not yet fully examined. We are also aware of the potential pitfalls for democracy and the
disempowered when people talk only amongst their “own kind,” and so we offer the proverbial
two cheers rather than three for this kind of talk. But we see the dangers as surmountable when
structured group discussion among the least powerful is sandwiched between prior and
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subsequent exposure to actors in the broader policy sphere. We support our claims with evidence
from a civic forum that was modified to foster deliberation among the disempowered – a
consensus conference on the issue of municipal broadband Internet service. We conclude by
considering how novel forms of deliberation among the least powerful might be built into
different kinds of civic forums and how researchers might assess their value. In doing so, we
respond to deliberative scholars’ and practitioners’ calls for research on pressing questions about
how the design and structure of deliberation affects its quality and outcomes, as well as the
relationship between deliberation and advocacy or public involvement.21
Enclave Deliberation and the Disempowered
Before proceeding, we should note what we mean by disempowered groups. Although
power is multifaceted and can be historically fluid,22 at any given time and place there are
identifiable groups that are “more difficult to organize, articulate, mobilize, and integrate into
policy discussions.”23 They may be formally excluded from aspects of the political system (e.g.,
because they are denied voting rights or legal standing in administrative arenas) or may lack
resources for effective organization and action. Such groups typically exert demonstrably less
influence on institutional and public policy making through organized lobbying, campaign
contributions, legal advocacy, voting, and other major methods of affecting policy. 24 As a result,
policy makers serve these groups’ interests less well when they conflict with the interests of
better organized groups possessed of greater resources to press their case. Historical examples of
the disempowered in the United States include African-Americans and women, especially prior
to each group gaining effective ability to vote. Perhaps the clearest examples in the
contemporary U.S. are low-income people and undocumented immigrants.25 We stress, though,
that our definition of disempowered is not limited to questions of identity. The groups we have
in mind may fall into identifiable demographic categories, as in the case of the gender or ethnic
groups, but they may also be disempowered in relation to particular issues, regardless of other
socio-demographic attributes or privileges they may enjoy.
The Challenges
At best, most deliberative democrats tend to tolerate with ambivalence the idea of
deliberation among homogeneous groups. Because there are good reasons to be cautious about
enclave deliberation, we pause to review them before introducing the potential benefits.
First, homogeneity can undermine the legitimacy of deliberation. As Gastil suggests,
many adherents to a “common good” vision of deliberative democracy are implicitly driven by
the attempt to discover Rousseau’s general will – that expression of the public based on the
common interest, rather than on the claims of factions (interest groups or stakeholders) or the
aggregation of private individual views.26 A randomly selected or representative group is seen as
more likely to transcend narrow interests and consider the common interest.27 A somewhat
different normative rationale is that “outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective
assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in
question,” or where those affected have at least an equal right to participate.28 In addition, even
if we accept the legitimacy of some self-interested advocacy in deliberation, as we must
realistically, a group that fails to include a broad cross-section of those who are most affected by

3

their decision will likely draw protest or indifference from those who feel that their interests
were excluded.29
Second, more homogeneous groups can limit the diversity of views considered and
therefore the quality of deliberation. At the extreme, enclave deliberation may breed groupthink,
in which maintaining the unity of the group comes to outweigh all other aims.30 Such groups
tend to make poor decisions based on incomplete and biased information and fail to weigh
alternatives fully. The classic signs of groupthink include overestimating the group’s power and
moral justness, sharing an illusion of unanimous opinion among members (often based on selfcensorship and quashing dissent), and ignoring evidence that contradicts the group’s views.31
Experimental research in social psychology often finds that homogeneous groups are also more
vulnerable to group polarization, in which “members of a deliberating group predictably move
toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation
tendencies.”32 In this theory, the group fails to change or moderate its initial views because of
social comparison, as members fear loss of reputation by being in the minority,33 or because the
majority can supply more arguments for their position and thereby strengthen their confidence in
their views, win over the undecided, and silence opponents.34 In either case, group members do
not decide based on the strongest arguments. Groups are most likely to polarize if they see
themselves as sharing an identity that is made salient to them during deliberation (such as party
affiliation, race, gender, or profession) and if they meet regularly over time while insulating
themselves from competing views.35 Democratic theorists, most notably Cass Sunstein, therefore
warn that greater homogeneity, especially among the disempowered, could lead to a greater
sense of alienation from government and citizens outside the group, increasing mistrust and
undermining individual self-efficacy.36
The Potentials
Despite these concerns, some deliberative democrats see value in enclave deliberation
among those with little power, especially as it occurs within voluntary organizations and social
movements. There are several justifications for creating spaces within any democratic society for
enclave deliberation among disempowered groups.
First, if enclave deliberation violates the ideal that all who are affected by a decision
should have an equal opportunity to participate in making it, this is not a normative problem so
long as enclave deliberation is one step in a larger public discussion that includes cross-cutting
talk between social groups. Furthermore, the notion that all who may be affected must have a
chance to be selected to deliberate through representative sampling is impractical in almost all
cases. Strictly speaking, representative sampling for deliberation is enormously difficult and
presents legitimacy problems of its own, even setting aside basic rights of free association. Ryfe
summarizes the main reasons why.37 It is impractical, and often impossible, to reconcile the
demands of deliberation in small groups with the numbers required to achieve a representative
sample of any large scale polity. If legitimacy requires that all those who are affected by a
decision should be sampled, it is difficult to determine the boundaries of such a group given the
interdependence of local, national, and global politics. And if participants are chosen to ensure
that all major viewpoints or communities are represented, deliberators are also expected to learn
and be open to changing their views as they discuss them with others, which means that
participants may no longer represent the positions or communities that justified their inclusion in
the first place. Thus, “by fulfilling one deliberative principle (learning), the method short-
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circuits another (representativeness).”38 Enclave deliberation does not elude these difficulties.
Our point is that attempts at representativeness do not necessarily guarantee greater deliberative
legitimacy than attempts to recruit enclaves.
Second, requiring consensus does not guarantee that those who hold minority views will
be coerced. Mendelberg’s review of the empirical literature concludes that the effect of decision
rules on deliberation depends on a range of contextual factors, including homogeneity.39
Empirical evidence shows that in groups of friends, women, or social equals, for example,
requiring unanimity rather than majority rule can spark “deliberation that makes people more
open-minded and willing to listen to minority views, resolving conflict properly and leaving
deliberators feeling that everyone received a fair hearing.”40 Though such outcomes are not
always to be found, they may be especially likely in groups that develop a strong sense of
community with shared interests and norms.41 It may be safer for people to reconsider their
views among their peers than in more diverse settings, where defending minority identities
against the majority may be more salient.42
Third, as Sunstein concedes, even if group polarization occurs, this is not an inherently
undesirable outcome from a normative standpoint. At any given place or time, a normatively
laudable position that is perceived as “extreme” by the majority – such as calling for the
abolition of slavery in the United States in the early 1800s – may be more just than a “moderate”
stance. Thus, to reject all instances of polarization within disempowered groups would be to
adopt a conservative bias against innovative views or a centrist bias against minority positions.
In at least some instances, polarization among disempowered groups may be a sign of
deliberative breakthrough, not deliberative dysfunction. Similarly, genuine deliberation does not
have to end in movement away from participants’ pre-discussion attitudes.43 As long as
participants hear and seriously consider a range of views, it is as legitimate for deliberation to
clarify and strengthen deliberators’ pre-existing positions as to change them.
Fourth, the deliberation of the disempowered may be necessary to broaden the range of
voices and views in the wider public sphere. Self-selected participants in organized public
discussion tend to be disproportionately white, middle class or affluent college graduates, which
undermines the aim of equal participation and diversity of views by failing to involve those who
participate less in the political system.44 Therefore, as Sunstein observes:
A certain measure of isolation will, in some cases, be crucial to the development of ideas
and approaches that would not otherwise emerge and that deserve a social hearing.
Members of low-status groups are often quiet within heterogeneous bodies, and
deliberation in such bodies tends to be dominated by high-status members. Any shift . . .
that increases the number of deliberating enclaves will likewise increase the diversity of
society’s aggregate ‘argument pool’.45
Enclave deliberation can thus serve the larger cause of a fully inclusive public discourse by
giving disempowered or marginalized groups an opportunity to develop their own unique
perspectives and arguments, which might otherwise be overlooked or ignored.
Fifth, as the anti-slavery and African American civil rights movements demonstrate as
well, enclaves can serve equality by allowing marginalized groups to coalesce by discovering
their common interests and identities, strengthening their resolve to advocate for themselves, and
building organizations that can do so effectively.46 By removing professional experts and highstatus citizens from the group’s deliberation over policy positions, enclave deliberation may
allow disempowered participants to overcome oft-observed forms of coercion by elites, leading
to greater group solidarity and political efficacy.47
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Our review of the advantages and disadvantages of enclave deliberation suggests that
there are in fact three kinds of enclaves that are sometimes conflated and that contextual factors,
not simply the existence of common ties, have a good deal to do with whether such groups will
polarize.. One kind of enclave consists of ad hoc groups who share similar pre-deliberation
views on the issue at hand, such as the typical groups convened by experimental researchers in
the lab. An example would be a racially and economically diverse group of U.S. citizens
convened to discuss whether documented and undocumented immigrants in the USA should be
given citizenship rights, in which a majority of the group already holds pro-immigrant views.
Another type of enclave, suggested by the defense of homogeneous groups as a means of
discovering affiliations and contributing new perspectives to the public sphere, may be defined
as one in which members occupy a shared structural location in relation to the issue. In relation
to the immigration example, such groups would include immigration lawyers, public school
educators who teach immigrant children, or employers who depend on immigrant labor. A third
kind of enclave may be defined as one in which members feel that they share a common predeliberation identity. This definition is suggested by experimental studies that find groups
perceiving themselves as sharing an identity are more likely to polarize during deliberation and
also by defenses of enclave deliberation as a tool for strengthening solidarity among groups,
especially in the social movement literature cited above. For the immigration debate, examples
would be groups of Mexican-Americans or Irish-Americans, some of whom have lived as
citizens in the USA for generations and others who are relative newcomers, but all of whom see
themselves in part through the prism of their ethnic identity. It is possible for an enclave to share
a viewpoint, location, and identity, but our point is that this cannot be assumed by
predeliberation agreement on an issue, or common social circumstances, or shared demographic
characteristics (such as race). One need not embrace a postmodern theory of identity as radically
contingent to appreciate that our self-concepts and views are shaped in part by group contexts
and cues that make some aspects of our identity more salient than others.
Further, in each kind of enclave, the salience of members’ viewpoints, locations, and
identities may depend in part on the kind of issue that is put to them. Again, the context of group
discussion can make potential enclave relationships either more or less salient. It may be that
polarization is less likely to occur if the issue is not one that draws attention to their common
bonds (e.g., for immigration lawyers, whether to ban burning of the U.S. flag or to repeal the
estate tax), or if the organizer of the deliberation does not make group members’ potential
common stake in the issue more salient to them (e.g, by addressing them as “MexicanAmericans” or “Irish-Americans”), or if the group is confronted with an issue that is just
emerging into public discourse and therefore is not easily incorporated into group members’
existing political schemas (such as whether to offer public subsidies for nanotechnology
research).48
With these understandings of enclaves and their potential roles in the discursive
landscape in mind, we suggest that new civic forums could provide important spaces for enclave
deliberation by the dispossessed. Such forums are designed to foster deliberation of higher
quality and legitimacy than in many other contexts in which deliberation often fails, such as
informal conversations among social networks49 or traditional public hearings and meetings.50
Civic forums are more likely to provide the conditions for successful deliberation on equal terms
that have been identified by empirical research.51 When these deliberative events are designed
well, participants have access to a great deal of information, including from experts and
stakeholders, and a broad range of arguments (to counteract groupthink and polarization).
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Groups perceive the stakes of their decision as consequential for the wider policy sphere
(sustaining the motivation to deliberate). A broad range of discursive styles, from rational
argument to personal anecdotes, are accepted as valid in discussion (providing an inclusive
climate). Supportive facilitation helps guide and model deliberative thinking for the group
(offering training in what is an unfamiliar form of communication for many). Discursive rules
protect participants’ equal opportunity to participate and foster mutual respect (creating a
willingness to consider others’ views and build trust). In this way, a well-designed civic forum
may serve to enhance the laudable qualities of enclave deliberation, while simultaneously
guarding against its more worrisome possibilities.
Consensus Conference Case Study
To evaluate our claim that civic forums could improve conditions of equality by
incorporating enclave deliberation by the marginalized, we draw on evidence from an established
format for cross-cutting deliberation – the consensus conference – that was modified to foster
deliberation among the disempowered about their interests. Consensus conferences aim to
promote informed public deliberation among small groups of community members to arrive at
policy recommendations by unanimous decision.52 Developed by the Danish Board of
Technology and adopted by government and civil society groups around the world, consensus
conferences have mainly focused on science and technology policy. In an ideal-typical
conference, the project’s organizers appoint an advisory panel of stakeholders on the topic at
hand to oversee the fairness and inclusiveness of the conference. The advisory panel reviews the
process of selecting and educating a panel of 12 to 25 community members. Conference
organizers provide the community panel with background briefing papers about the issue, some
of which may be written from a neutral perspective on the issues, while others may reflect the
views of different stakeholders. The organizers and advisory panel select a group of experts
representing a wide range of perspectives on the controversy. A facilitator helps the community
panel to identify the questions they want to pose directly to the experts at a public hearing. After
the hearing, the facilitator leads the community panel in structured deliberation to produce a
consensus statement of policy recommendations. Significantly, the community panel is not
restricted to choosing between options provided to them by others on a predetermined agenda of
issues, but is free to add their own issues and solutions throughout the process. Their findings
are presented publicly to government, the news media, and the public to amplify the panel’s
voice, attract attention to the issue, and stimulate ongoing deliberation.
However, the traditional consensus conference is vulnerable to the same concerns about
inequality that we have reviewed earlier. The organizers and advisory panel may subtly
marginalize some views in their selection of briefing materials, community panelists, and
experts. Norms of rationality and consensus may discriminate against community panelists who
have less education, deliberative experience, and socio-economic status. Consideration of the
common good and the goal of consensus may lead to coercion of those with minority viewpoints.
To counteract these concerns, the conference organizers in this case study departed from
standard practice by exclusively recruiting members of disempowered groups to form the
community panel. Explaining how and why the panelists were chosen requires some discussion
of the issues the conference addressed.
Municipal Broadband and Digital Inclusion
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In response to the slow and uneven extension of commercial high-speed Internet service
in the United States in the mid-2000s, hundreds of municipal governments began considering
whether to build their own broadband networks, triggering a robust policy debate over whether
cities should invest public funds in such endeavors at all, and, if so, whether to subsidize access
for those least likely to have it.53 In Silicon Valley, where the conference was held, an alliance
of over 40 cities had begun to plan one of the largest regional wireless broadband networks in the
country. Some municipal broadband projects, such as Philadelphia’s and San Francisco’s, had
put a high priority on the goal of offering affordable broadband to all residents to close the
digital divide between those with high-speed service and those without it. However, the Silicon
Valley broadband network was driven primarily by the goals of improving economic
competitiveness and the internal communications of government agencies.54 The project was
spearheaded by Wireless Silicon Valley (WSV), a task force led by city and county Information
Technology managers that also included local electrical utilities, county sheriff departments, and
public transportation authorities.
In a context of low public attention to the project, two centers based at Santa Clara
University – the Broadband Institute of California and the Center for Science, Technology and
Society – organized a consensus conference in October 2006 on municipal broadband and digital
inclusion.55 At the outset, the conference organizers (a law professor, a communication
professor, a political science professor, and a professional facilitator) posed several broad
questions for the conference to address, especially with reference to the planned Silicon Valley
network:
1. Should governments become involved in creating municipal broadband networks?
2. If so, how should municipal broadband networks be paid for and operated to maximize
public benefits, especially to underserved communities?
3. If so, will digital inclusion require governments to provide additional resources to help
underserved communities use broadband to meet their economic, civic, and cultural
needs? 56
The conference offered the first substantive effort at public consultation about the Silicon Valley
project, in an environment of sparse media coverage of the proposed network and no organized
attempts to influence its direction by civil society organizations. The WSV director sat on the
advisory panel for the conference; he and representatives from several of the private partners
chosen to build the network testified to the community panel at the public hearing. Although
some of the contours of the network had been defined – including private ownership and
management – much was still to be determined, including subscription costs and digital inclusion
efforts. Therefore, the community panel had a unique opportunity to influence the project’s
decision-makers, although it was clear that its recommendations were advisory, not binding.
Instead of recruiting a community panel reflective of Silicon Valley as a whole, the
organizers formed an enclave, each of whom was a member of at least one of the groups that had
the lowest rates of home access to commercial broadband in the U.S. at the time: low-income
people, African-Americans, Hispanics, seniors, the disabled, and rural residents.57 All of these
groups were represented on the panel and many participants fell into more than one of these
categories (e.g., African-American and disabled). Although the conference brought community
panelists in contact with the views of government and industry leaders through background
readings and the public hearing, the group’s deliberation about its policy recommendations
focused on the task of articulating the interests of a disempowered group relative to the issue of
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broadband access, rather than on consideration of the common good (which might have included
the interests of telecommunications companies, which feared competition from municipal
networks, and other residents who could easily afford broadband access, and who therefore
might not have been as willing to invest tax dollars in providing access to those who could not
afford it). Thus, the panel formed an enclave in the sense that all shared a structural position as
belonging to a group that was least served by home broadband Internet service. In deliberation,
as they were asked by the conference organizers to consider recommendations for connecting
these groups to broadband, the community panel likely developed a stronger shared identity as
members and representatives of the underserved.58
Other elements of the project adhered to the typical consensus conference format. The
organizers recruited an advisory panel of 11 stakeholders from local governments, civil society
organizations working on digital inclusion, and the technology and telecommunications
industries. The advisory panel approved plans for recruiting community panelists, reviewed a
briefing paper to ensure that it was fair and inclusive of major perspectives on the issues, and
approved the composition of the experts who testified at the public hearing. Panelists received
the briefing paper about one month prior to the conference. During the first weekend of the
conference, the organizers gave community panelists a presentation on the issues summarized in
the briefing paper to refresh their memories and responded to the panel’s questions. The
facilitator helped the group prioritize and define their questions about the issues for the experts
and identify additional readings for each member based on her or his interests. During the
second weekend, the community panel posed their questions to 11 experts from industry,
government, and community organizations who testified at the public hearing, then began their
deliberations in small groups focused on specific issues and in the full group. During the third
weekend, the facilitator helped the community members come to consensus on policy
recommendations. The organizers publicized the community panel’s policy recommendations
widely to government, industry, community organizations, and the news media.59 In addition,
several months later the organizers convened a follow-up forum by videoconference to discuss
the community panel’s recommendations with 60 representatives of municipalities, community
groups, and municipal broadband service providers in four California cities where similar
projects were planned or underway.
In its recommendations, the panel agreed that local governments should commission and
control municipal broadband networks, with private companies building and operating the
networks, especially to reach the underserved. The panel also made detailed recommendations
on how cities could extend broadband access to underserved groups by subsidizing computer
hardware and software, provide training, design networks to be accessible to people with
disabilities and non-English speakers, protect users’ privacy and security, serve rural areas, and
involve the public in network planning and oversight.60
Research Questions
Because this was exploratory research, rather than developing formal hypotheses, we
posed research questions, which aimed to address some likely concerns of deliberative democrats
and their critics about this example of structured enclave deliberation. First, did the enclave
group become sufficiently well-informed about the issues it considered? Second, did the enclave
group experience positive changes in civic attitudes that are often found in successful
deliberation among more heterogeneous groups? Prior research indicates that deliberation in
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mixed groups can increase issue knowledge, interest in politics, trust in government, individual
self-efficacy, trust in others, and commitment to the common good.61 Deliberative democrats
may fear that the absence of information and viewpoints that more educated participants can
bring to the discussion might weaken the group’s information base and ability to build trust
across social differences. Meanwhile, many critics of deliberation argue that the disempowered
need to participate in social movements to acquire authentic issue knowledge and self-efficacy.62
Our first and second questions are an attempt to understand the extent to which enclave
deliberation can also be a valuable school for democracy, helping participants build the
knowledge and skills needed to go forth and participate in mainstream policy circles on many
issues.
Third, was the group able to consider a diversity of views, avoiding both groupthink and
group polarization stemming from social comparison? Deliberative scholars’ greatest concern
about enclaves may be that they are unable to see beyond their similarities and come to
appreciate the potential diversity of perspectives within their group. Fourth, were the
deliberative process and outcomes seen as legitimate – both internally (by community panelists)
and externally (by experts and policy makers in government, activists, and industry figures)? We
have seen that despite their differences, both deliberative democrats and their critics appeal to the
values of internal equality and autonomy, which may be threatened especially by the domination
of forum organizers, expert authority, and mainstream ideology. Deliberation’s proponents and
critics also raise concerns about whether its process and outcomes can be seen as legitimate by
outsiders.63 In particular, there is a danger that external stakeholders will dismiss the
deliberation as poorly informed, not open to diverse viewpoints, and powerless to influence
public discourse. These worries may be especially well-founded when deliberation takes place
among disempowered groups, who may be seen by others as less knowledgeable and more
partisan than more heterogeneous, representative groupings.
Methods
To answer our research questions, we surveyed many different groups involved in the
consensus conference process, including the community panel, a non-deliberating control group,
advisory and expert panelists, and participants in the follow-up event on municipal broadband in
California.
The community panel and control group were recruited by distributing applications to
approximately 80 social service agencies and community-based organizations. Almost all of the
members of each group were clients of these organizations. Two in the community panel (or 17
percent) and four in the control group (or 27 percent) were staff members (computer instructors
to the disabled or elderly), but none occupied leadership positions in their organizations. To
encourage open deliberation, applicants who were employed by or belonged to an organization
that had previously taken a public position on municipal broadband were excluded from both the
community panel and control group. From the 95 applications received, the organizers selected
12 community panel members and 15 control group members, each of whom belonged to at least
one group with the lowest rates of home broadband access: low-income people (defined as
household earnings below 50 percent of four-county median income), African-Americans,
Hispanics, seniors, the disabled, and rural residents.64 However, to ensure that each group had
enough experience of home broadband access to discuss whether it was valuable, the organizers
required that at least half of the community and control group had home access. Table 1 reports
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the characteristics of each group. Although assignment to the control group was not strictly
random (availability on the conference weekends sometimes determined placement in control or
community group, for example), the two groups were fairly evenly matched, with two
exceptions. The control group had slightly fewer years of education on average (although the
difference is mainly between those with some college and a college diploma), and the control
group had somewhat greater access to broadband at home.
Table 1 about here
The community panelists responded to surveys one month prior to the start of the
conference, at the end of each weekend of the conference, and again one month following the
conference’s completion.65 The control group completed survey questionnaires prior to the
consensus conference and again one month after its completion.66 Advisory panelists and
experts who testified at the public hearing completed online questionnaires one month prior to
the conference and one month after its completion. The experts and advisors were about evenly
split between the telecommunications industry (n=5); civil society organizations working for
digital inclusion (n=7); and representatives, consultants, and service providers to local
governments (n=6). Follow-up event participants (n=57), who were asked to review the
recommendations of the community panelists, were about evenly split between the government
and civil society categories. The response rate for the community and control panels was 100
percent, for the advisors and experts 39 percent, and for the follow-up event participants 61
percent.67 (We present operational measures along with our findings).
These data present limitations and strengths. Like most case studies, this one involves a
quasi-experimental design involving a small number of participants in a unique context, all of
which requires some prudence about the external validity and the generalizability of our findings.
On the other hand, our case study approach also has some signal virtues for assessing the quality
and equity of enclave deliberation. Compared with much of the research on enclave deliberation,
which involves one-time discussions in a lab setting among college students, we are able to train
the analytical microscope in fine detail on the dynamics of participant attitudes over an extended
period of deliberation about a current issue of real-world significance. Repeated inquiry about
community panelists’ impressions of both the process and the substance of the issues allows us
to show how participant attitudes changed (or remained constant) during the course of the
deliberations. Much research on deliberation, such as that on deliberative polls, has been
critiqued for failing to distinguish the effect of providing participants with more information on a
topic from the impact of deliberation itself. The skeptics suggest that if the benefits attributed to
deliberation are in fact merely the result of being more informed about a range of policy
positions by briefing materials, or exposure to public officials, then perhaps deliberation is
unnecessary.68 Our research design surveyed participants before they received a briefing paper,
at the end of all three weekends of deliberation, and one month after the conclusion of the
conference – a research design that allows us to discern the effects of the initial provision of
information and discussion on a number of outcomes more precisely than prior research. In
addition, we are able assess the external legitimacy of the deliberation through surveys of a
diverse group of policy advocates, industry, and government decision-makers. In all, this case
study provides some of the most careful, detailed empirical data available today of structured
enclave deliberation among the less powerful.
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Findings and Discussion
Information
Our first research question asked about whether the enclave group was sufficiently wellinformed about the issues it considered. A potential concern about deliberation in more
homogeneous groups is that participants may not gain sufficient knowledge about an issue
because they will not be exposed to facts that support alternative positions and will not have to
deploy facts that support their positions to persuade others. There is reason to expect that
community panelists might lack basic information, given their relatively low levels of internet
access and familiarity with municipal broadband prior to the conference.
Figures 1a-1b about here
We begin with some objective measures of panelists’ knowledge, which are broad
indicators of basic learning that do not attempt to capture the sum of participants’ issue
knowledge. However, panelists’ inability to report this information would raise doubts about
whether they were sufficiently well-informed. Our evidence shows that participants came to
know important facts about broadband technology over the course of their involvement with the
conference. Whereas only two-thirds of panelists could describe the difference between
broadband and dial-up Internet service without prompting prior to the conference, more than 90
percent correctly answered the question one month after the conference’s conclusion (see Figure
1a). Knowledge levels of the control group also increased, but by only 7 percentage points, as
opposed to the 25 points among the community panelists. In addition, compared to their preconference responses, community panelists were able to generate a significantly longer list of
activities computer users could engage in with broadband but not with dialup access. As Figure
1b shows, community panelists were able to offer, on average, almost one more advantage of
broadband after the conference than before it (p=.017) – an increase of nearly 70 percent,
compared with little improvement in the control group.
Figure 2 about here
Community panelists also gained a better sense of how access to broadband within the
United States compares to access in other countries. Whereas prior to the conference no
community panelist could correctly rank the U.S. among OECD countries in broadband
subscribers per capita, fully three-quarters of community panelists could do so one month after
the deliberations, while the control group exhibited essentially no change (see Figure 2).69
Table 2 about here
These objective measures of information are strengthened by the subjective impressions
of both conference participants and outside observers. Table 2 highlights participants’ sense of
their own levels of knowledge after each of the three consensus conference weekends as well as
at-a-distance summary judgments from advisory panelists and experts who testified to the panel
at a public hearing. From the first weekend on, participants felt that they were receiving highquality information about municipal broadband, and they expressed strong agreement with the
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idea that they were learning new information and considering new points of view. Just as
importantly, community panelists appeared to grasp that they had much to learn and that such
learning would continue over the course of each conference weekend. In other words,
participants felt that they gained new information as the deliberation proceeded across each
weekend. For them, learning about the issues appeared to include more than simply reading the
background briefing paper, and their subjective sense of learning continued through the final full
weekend of deliberation. After the first two weekends, participants were, on average, unsure
whether they understood enough to make effective recommendations, but by the end of the last
weekend, when they completed their policy recommendations, the panelists felt strongly that
their conclusions had been backed by sufficient information.
Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting this point is provided by the outside experts
who observed or testified at the conference’s public hearing and read the group’s policy
recommendations. As Table 2 highlights, these experts tended to share participants’ impression
that they were provided with sufficient information to produce well-grounded policy
recommendations. In addition, the experts who observed the public hearing came away satisfied
that the community panelists were conversant in the important issues and found the panel’s
policy recommendations exhibited a solid understanding of “the basic issues surrounding
municipal broadband.”
We interpret this combination of evidence as cause for optimism about well-structured
enclave deliberation’s ability to inform disempowered participants sufficiently, though additional
research is needed to explore the limits of such learning. Still, these results point to the
conclusion that organizers of structured deliberations can ensure that information relevant to a
broad range of arguments is provided and considered through background briefing papers,
presentations, hearings, and facilitation that gently challenges participants to support their
arguments with factual claims as well as other forms of evidence. In addition, these findings
suggest that the effects of the initial provision of information in the briefing paper, exposure to
experts at the public hearing, and deliberation among the group cannot be as neatly disentangled
as skeptics of deliberation suggest. Participants did not simply stop learning after reading the
briefing paper. Instead, they strongly agreed that they learned new information and discovered
new perspectives on all three weekends of the conference (see Table 2), including the third
weekend devoted entirely to their deliberations among themselves. The assumption that nonexperts could absorb all the information they need from reading a paper, or from interaction with
experts, is not borne out by our data. Rather, the community panelists repeatedly indicated that
they learned in part through discussion with their peers. Given the striking consistency of their
responses, it seems unlikely that other benefits from the conference discussed below can be
attributed entirely to upfront provision of information or exposure to experts and not at all to
deliberation.
Attitudes
Second, we asked whether the enclave group experienced positive changes in civic
attitudes that are often found in successful deliberation among more heterogeneous groups. To
the extent that these attitudinal benefits depend on interacting with a diverse set of deliberators,
greater homogeneity, especially among the disempowered, could lead to a greater sense of
disempowerment, difference or alienation from government and citizens outside the group,
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increasing resentment or mistrust. Therefore, we administered a plethora of measures of these
attitudes before and after the conference to the community panel and control group.
On a number of measures, we found that the conference did not provoke statistically
meaningful change. Participation in the conference had no significant effects on broader interest
in local politics or broadband policy, frequency of discussion of local affairs or broadband
policy, trust in local government, confidence in speaking abilities, assessments of local
government decision-making processes, confidence in the competency of average people to deal
with a complex political world, or belief in the ability of ordinary people to consider all opinions
or to back up their opinions with good reasons. On the other hand, the conference did not lead to
any meaningful declines on these measures of civic attitudes, either.70 We note, too, that
community participants came to the conference with generally high levels of interest in politics
and confidence in the abilities of ordinary people, so the lack of change can be attributed, in part,
to a ceiling effect. In addition, with respect to some measures, such as trust in local government
or assessments of local decision-making, it is not clear that the conference should have provoked
change, as community panelists had little direct exposure to local politicians or decision-making
processes.
Figure 3 about here
At the same time, we found moderate but statistically meaningful effects on some
measures of efficacy and trust. The strongest changes in internal efficacy came with respect to
respondents’ sense that they were well-qualified to participate in community politics (see Figure
3). While the control group trended slightly in the opposite direction, community panelists
tended to feel more confident about their abilities after participating in the consensus conference,
moving approximately one-half point on the 5-point scale, a change that is significant at the 90
percent confidence level (p=.06).
Figure 4 about here
Community panelists’ levels of interpersonal trust and their sense of ordinary individuals’
commitment to the common good also increased meaningfully over the course of the conference.
Interpersonal trust was measured with a three-item scale coded to range between 0 and 1, with
higher numbers indicating greater trust.71 Mean levels of trust among the control group did not
change at all, while the community group saw an increase of over 11 percentage points on the
scale. This change is significant at the .10 level, which we interpret as meaningful movement,
considering the small sample size. As Figure 4 shows, the difference between the control group
and the community panel increased over time, with the post-conference difference between the
two groups reaching nearly a quarter of the trust scale, a difference that achieves solid levels of
statistical significance (p=.06).
Similarly, the community panel showed an increasing commitment to the notion that
most people can overcome their self-interest and pursue the common good. The survey question
asked respondents how much they agree or disagree with the statement: “Most people are too
self-interested to agree on solutions that serve the common good.” While the control group
showed a slight movement in the direction of increasing agreement with the statement, the
community panel moved sharply in the other direction. Among the community panelists, the
pre-conference mean was 2.5 (1=”strongly agree”, 5=“strongly disagree”), while the post-
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conference mean increased to 3.08 – not yet strong levels of disagreement, but definite
movement in that direction. This change exceeds standard levels of statistical significance
(p=.03).
As a whole, the consensus conference did not fundamentally alter most of the
participants’ attitudes about local government, including levels of interest in and discussion of
local politics or municipal broadband. Given that the conference lasted for only three weekends,
and participants’ relatively high initial levels of interest and engagement, it is perhaps too much
to expect dramatic improvement in these attitudes. Yet participants also did not become more
disillusioned about their ability to participate meaningfully in civic life. We find solid evidence
that the conference increased respondents’ confidence in their qualifications to participate in
politics and increased resistance to the notion that politics are too complicated for people like
them to deal with. We also found that conference participation increased social trust and
bolstered optimism that people can see beyond narrow self-interests to a broader public good.
These results contradict concerns that enclave deliberation further alienates participants from
mainstream civic life.
Diversity of Views
Our third set of research questions asked whether conference participants were able to
consider a broad range of views rather than succumbing to groupthink (failing to consider
diverse views in order to maintain group unity) or polarization (moving toward an extreme
position in the direction to which the group was initially inclined) for the wrong reasons (social
comparison rather than free reflection on the best arguments). We expected that quality
deliberation would be marked by the ability to recognize points of common agreement, but also
to acknowledge the presence of disagreement when it existed.72 In contrast, groupthink would be
characterized by a heavy focus on consensus without recognition of a diversity of opinions
within the panel. Group polarization sparked by social comparison would be indicated by an
extreme shift in position in order to avoid conflict within the group.
Figures 5a and 5b about here.
Early in the process, most community panelists did not perceive differences of opinion
among the group. As Figure 5a reveals, after the first weekend most participants strongly
disagreed that “important disagreements” separated the panelists. In response to an open-ended
query about what the panelists “disagreed most” about, many panelists could not name any point
of disagreement. However, the first weekend’s activities focused on learning about the issues,
identifying needs for additional information, and forming questions to pose at the public hearing,
rather than on deliberation about the benefits of different policies. It is likely that the group
perceived little discord because their group activities that week were focused on seeking
information rather than taking positions. However, as participants shifted into deliberation over
their policy recommendations during the second and third weekends, they reported an increase in
disagreement about the issues under discussion and a much greater variety of perspectives being
discussed (see Figures 5a and 5b). By the end of the final weekend, all twelve participants could
name at least one important difference of opinion among group members in response to openended queries. In their assessments of the conference one month after its conclusion, community
panelists judged that allowing “people to air differences of opinion and discuss different points
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of view” was one of the most important goals of the conference (mean=6.75, SD=0.62 on a 1 to
7 scale, where 1= “not important at all” and 7 = “very important”).73
Despite their perception of more differences being aired as the conference proceeded, the
participants generally found these different perspectives were welcomed, considered, and
respected, rather than being a source of discomfort (see Table 3). Even on the final conference
weekend, when disagreements were confronted directly and the sometimes arduous work of
forging agreement in the face of strong and diverse opinions took place, most panelists still felt
relatively comfortable with the deliberative exchange. Most said the process helped them to
consider alternative points of view rather than closing off consideration of diverse opinions.
When asked a month later whether the conference process had caused them to rethink their initial
positions about municipal broadband, only two panelists said that it had not. In the end, the
panelists were able to come to consensus on ten pages of detailed policy recommendations. By
the conclusion of the third conference weekend, their mean level of agreement with the statement
“I fully support all of the community panel’s policy recommendations” was 1.5 on a scale from 1
(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) (SD=.492).
Table 3 about here
These findings run in precisely the opposite direction expected by critics of enclave
deliberation. Instead of groupthink, in which consensus is based on silencing dissent or adopting
an illusory sense of unanimous agreement in the interests of group unity, participants
increasingly recognized that their consensus emerged from a climate characterized by real
differences of opinion. Rather than undesirable group polarization, in which members tip
unreflectively toward an extreme position in which the group inclines in order to save face or
follow perceived group norms, participants became increasingly aware of conflicts amongst
themselves, but were not made uncomfortable by them, and still achieved consensus on those
recommendations upon which they could agree.
On the two issues that provoked the longest debates, the panel hammered out carefully
considered agreements that were inclusive compromises rather than a movement toward an
extreme position. One debate focused on the role of private companies in operating municipal
networks. After much discussion, the panelists agreed that “municipal governments should be
involved in developing and controlling broadband networks and should require private
companies to operate the networks in ways that provide public benefits.”74 The panel suggested
that “a broadband oversight committee could be established with equal representation of public,
private and municipal interests. Ongoing public input should inform decisions about these
networks. However, private companies should build and operate the networks.”75 This
recommendation expressed a nuanced compromise between those who prioritized private firms’
expertise at building networks and those who prioritized government oversight to protect the
public interest. Similarly, although the panelists agreed that broadband was a necessity, they
recognized that they could not come to consensus on whether a free tier of service should be
offered to low-income residents.76 Some participants felt a free service would be accompanied
by a significant drawback – that some low-income people like themselves would fail to value
and use the service if they did not have to pay for it. They also worried that a free tier would
mean something less than full equality of access, given the likelihood that a free service would
mean fewer online tools and benefits than paying households would get. A deeply committed
minority was unwilling, however, to cede their view that free service was integral to digital
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inclusion. Thus, after a long and sometimes contentious discussion about the meaning of
equality for disadvantaged groups and the tension between price and quality of service, the panel
agreed to recommend a “free or discounted tier” for low-income residents, but insisted that the
lowest-price tiers, whether or free or not, should offer the same speed, privacy, and security as a
full-price tier of service offered to paying households.77
These findings contradict the groupthink and polarization theories of enclave
deliberation. They suggest that the panelists achieved a high-quality consensus not based on the
absence of disagreement, but rather a willingness to engage differences productively and to press
forward together to achieve outcomes acceptable to all, even if some important disagreements
remained (as they inevitably will in any real-world political process). The experience of the
community panel thus appears to support claims that consensus-oriented deliberative processes
must also incorporate elements of adversarialism to successfully sustain consideration of diverse
views, encouraging participants to explore their differences and allowing room for negotiating
them.78
Of course, these findings also suggest the need for additional research into the
mechanisms that might have promoted such an apparently successful blending of consensus and
adversarial approaches, such as the role of the facilitator in establishing group norms that prize
both civil agreement and a willingness to air differences. We note, too, that the nature of the
questions the community participants engaged may have played a role in the Silicon Valley
outcome. The community panelists tackled only one closed-ended question (should governments
be involved in municipal broadband), a question on which they quickly agreed. On the further,
open-ended questions (how should governments be involved and what is needed to achieve
digital inclusion), the panel achieved hard-won consensus amid conflict. But the outcomes may
have been different if the panel had disagreed more on the initial closed-ended question or if
their further deliberation had centered on other, closed-ended questions. More research is
needed to better understand the ways in which the nature of the questions under consideration
shape enclave deliberation.
Internal and External Legitimacy
Our final set of research questions had to do with whether this example of enclave
deliberation was seen as both internally legitimate (by deliberators) and externally legitimate (by
political actors outside the group). We have already addressed several factors commonly used to
define the internal legitimacy of deliberation, presenting data indicating that participants
perceived they had sufficient information, fully supported the group’s recommendations, and
deliberated in a climate characterized by openness to a diversity of viewpoints, mutual respect,
and recognition of disagreement as well as consensus. In addition, we noted in the introduction
that deliberative theorists and their critics both judge deliberation’s internal legitimacy based on
the extent that participants exercise autonomy to make their own decisions rather than being
coerced by other group members, forum organizers, or mainstream policy discourse.
Self-reports and objective evidence suggest that the panelists were fairly autonomous.79
When asked to evaluate the decision-making dynamics in the final post-conference surveys,
participants expressed overwhelming agreement with the idea that the “community panelists’
recommendations came from the panelists themselves, not from the conference organizers”
(mean=1.08, SD=0.29 on 1-5 scale, where 1=”strongly agree” and 5=”strongly disagree) and
strong disagreement with the statement that “conference organizers influenced the panel’s
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recommendations too much” (mean=4.67, SD=0.65). Most participants also rejected the notion
that “a few members of the community panel dominated the discussion” (mean=3.92, SD=1.00).
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the panelists’ level of autonomy was their ability to add
to the issue agenda outlined by the organizers at the start of the conference. In particular, the
panel identified two issue areas that were not mentioned in the briefing paper or initial face-toface presentation of the issues by the organizers and made multiple recommendations on each
area. The panel raised the issue of protecting municipal broadband users’ privacy and security,
calling for equal privacy protections for all tiers of service, preventing system operators from
tracking or selling users’ personally identifiable information, and suggesting several specific
ways in which broadband providers could notify users about risks to their privacy and security
online. The panel also broached the issue of greater public involvement in every stage of
developing municipal broadband networks, recommending formation of a public advisory board
and specific steps it could take to guarantee “greater levels of deliberation among community
residents and frequent two-way communication between residents and other stakeholders.”80
Beyond the deliberators themselves, policy recommendations that emerge from more
homogeneous deliberation by marginal groups may be seen as illegitimate by stakeholders on the
issue, especially if they do not agree with the recommendations. Because this is a practical
question that is, strictly speaking, about perceived legitimacy, we measure external legitimacy as
“the extent to which key actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure
and its outcomes.”81 Here we have two sources of data – first, the impressions of the experts and
advisory panelists who had a supervisory role in examining conference briefing papers and were
involved in the public hearing, and second, a summary judgment from those who read the
panelists’ recommendations and attended the follow-up event several months later. These
respondents are a small but diverse group of social activists, telecommunications industry
representatives, and local government representatives who observed various aspects of the
consensus conference or its outcomes.
Table 4 about here.
These stakeholders tended to evaluate the work of the community panelists quite
positively. As we have already seen (Table 2), experts and advisory panelists expressed solid
agreement with the idea that community panelists and their recommendations were grounded in
sufficient factual information. In addition, Table 4 shows that the experts and advisory panelists
who attended the public hearing believed the presenters reflected a diverse set of views
(Mean=1.50, SD=.29) and that all different perspectives were treated fairly (Mean=1.25,
SD=.25). The experts and advisory panelists expressed moderate levels of confidence that the
panelists’ recommendations could actually influence subsequent debate (Mean=2.14, SD=.26)
and affect the perspectives of stakeholders (Mean=2.00, SD=.44). At the same time, the experts
also recognized that the panelists’ recommendations would not be embraced by all sides and
would likely be opposed by some interests (Mean=2.29, SD=.57). In other words, the outside
experts judged the panelists as having made a substantial contribution to subsequent deliberation
and decision-making on municipal broadband, articulating perspectives that would be taken
seriously but that were not simply parroting already-existing views and would likely provoke
opposition from some quarters.
The experts judged the panel’s recommendations as well-grounded and realistic, even if
they did not perfectly match the ideas and perspectives of the experts themselves. On average,
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experts and advisory panelists reported moderate levels of support for the recommendations
(Mean=2.00, SD=.22), although participants in the follow-up event who had read the panelists’
report were more enthusiastic (Mean=1.54, SD=.18). In their open-ended comments, experts
mentioned a variety of additional concerns and ideas they wished had been part of the panelists’
report, but invariably, these engaged stakeholders expressed admiration for the efforts of the
community panel and treated their work as a significant contribution to ongoing public discourse,
even if the experts did not agree with all the recommendations.82
Conclusion
This case study suggests that structured enclave deliberation among the less powerful that
involves immersion in a broad range of policy information and arguments could help resolve the
concerns of deliberative democracy’s critics, while fulfilling basic criteria for legitimate
deliberation that are widely shared by deliberative democrats. Participants in the consensus
conference increased their knowledge of the issues and experienced modest increases in selfefficacy and interpersonal trust rather than growing alienated or cynical about civic engagement.
Instead of adopting groupthink or dangerous forms of polarization, participants perceived greater
diversity of views the longer they deliberated, yet were able to arrive at a long list of policy
recommendations. These recommendations contributed new perspectives to the larger policy
debate and did not simply parrot the issue agenda outlined by conference organizers. Both the
participants and observers in government, industry, and advocacy groups perceived the
deliberative process and outcomes as legitimate.
Deliberative democrats are moving away from judging the legitimacy of deliberation by
the standard of a single ideal speech situation and toward a new appreciation for what different
forms of deliberation in diverse contexts can contribute to the democratic system as a whole.83
Having moved beyond rigid norms of consensus, the common good, and rationality that
undermined equal participation, deliberative democrats might well reconsider an exclusive
commitment to discussion in heterogeneous or quasi-representative groupings. We have argued
that the idea of enclaves is complex and may include homogenous viewpoints, structural
locations, or identities, with features of the deliberative context influencing whether or not
enclave perspectives are made salient. We conclude that political inclusion may sometimes be
served best by incorporating into deliberative civic forums more homogeneous groups of the
least powerful. This can be justified on behalf of ensuring equal footing if it improves upon
cross-cutting deliberative forums’ ability to attract participation by the marginalized, to develop
their political knowledge and skills, to discover common interests and positions without coercion
from the privileged or from each other, and to contribute a broader range of arguments to the
larger public sphere. Enclave deliberation is compatible with the normative basis for deliberative
democracy if it is preceded and followed by exposure to the larger public sphere.
What might this mean for deliberation’s practitioners and researchers? Comparative
research on civic forums that include enclave deliberation and those that do not would be most
helpful at identifying whether and why more homogeneity can boost deliberative quality and
equality. Because this study had no comparison group that was more heterogeneous, we cannot
offer evidence that structured deliberation in more homogeneous groups is better according to
our measures of equity and quality than deliberation in more heterogeneous groups, only that the
former need not lead to some of the problems foreseen by traditional deliberative theory and its
critics. Comparative research on equality in civic forums with and without enclave discussion
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would be helpful, but it would depend upon convincing forum organizers to include more
homogeneous groupings.
The quality of any deliberative forum is perhaps more complex because it depends on the
many contextual factors identified by Fung.84 Especially salient factors include who deliberates,
on what issues, and using what deliberative mode. First, our case study involved a group that did
not share a powerful group identity at the outset, but shared a structural position in relation to the
issue of broadband access and during deliberation developed a stronger collective identity as
representatives of the underserved. Cases in which participants recognize a more cohesive group
identity from the start would provide stronger tests of whether enclave deliberation among the
less powerful can avoid polarizing for the wrong reasons. Second, our case study group
deliberated over an issue that was only beginning to surface in the public sphere. Emerging
issues may be ideal for the quality of enclave deliberation because participants’ interests,
identities, and commitment to policy options are undiscovered territory. Under such conditions,
information tends to be scarce, issues are not yet clearly located in prevailing political frames,
and interest groups’ and policy makers’ positions are still relatively fluid. At these times,
deliberation among the dispossessed may be most likely to be educative, open, authentic, and
influential. Other aspects of the issue may have favored good deliberation as well by helping
clarify participants’ stakes: there was a strong local angle (Silicon Valley’s municipal broadband
plans), the issue required both discussion of facts (such as whether people take full advantage of
free services) and values (such as equal opportunity and privacy), and it allowed deliberators to
draw on their personal experience (of using the Internet). Research on enclave deliberation
about issues that are more established, less local, more fact-driven or value-driven, and less
accessible to personal experience could illuminate whether and how they provide the same
opportunities for high quality enclave deliberation. Third, research could help shed light on
whether other kinds of civic forums besides consensus conferences offer more or less congenial
homes for productive deliberation by the marginalized. Spaces for enclave deliberation could
feasibly be incorporated into all such forums, but they differ in design and purpose in numerous
ways.85 Features of the consensus conference that may be most relevant to deliberative quality in
enclaves include opportunities to interact directly with policy makers and activists, allowing
participants to generate their own policy options rather than simply choosing among those
presented by organizers, and requiring that recommendations be agreed to by consensus rather
than majority rule.
Perhaps the most important factor that may influence the quality of enclave deliberation
is how empowered these forums are in relation to government and other institutions. The
spectrum ranges from simply educating community members, to playing a one-time or ongoing
advisory role to government, to direct enactment of policy. Our case study involved a one-time
advisory relationship to officials and activists. This may be the optimal level of empowerment
for deliberative quality among the disempowered. In merely educative forums, the stakes may
be too low for participants to sustain a commitment to the hard work of deliberation. Although
we are not aware of civic forums in which disempowered people alone enact policy decisions
directly,86 and the prospects for such forums look dim, were they to come to pass they would
likely present the same barriers to reaching consensus seen in legislatures, as interest groups
attempted to “rig the jury” with their surrogates and bring other pressures to bear on behalf of
their positions.87 Ongoing advisory groups of the least powerful might increase in deliberative
quality as they build issue knowledge and discussion skills. But prolonged relations with
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government could also undermine deliberative quality by presenting possibilities for co-optation
by more powerful policy actors.
Our proposal need not involve a naïve belief that deliberative quality and equity can be
entirely perfected, only that they can be improved. We agree with Joshua Cohen’s recent
suggestion that quality deliberation, as opposed to lesser forms of discourse and discussion, is a
“fragile accomplishment” and that it would be overly simplistic to expect that “people are
waiting to deliberate.”88 Such caution seems to us especially wise with respect to enclave
deliberation. Our case study results thus suggest the need for additional systematic research into
the conditions under which enclave deliberation is likely to result in the sorts of encouraging
outcomes we found in the Silicon Valley conference. Consistent with Mutz’s call for testing
aspects of deliberation that are specifiable and falsifiable,89 we encourage further research that
explores the individual factors that may be necessary to promote successful enclave deliberation.
At the same time, such research should take seriously the possibility that these factors of group
composition, issue, deliberative mode, and level of empowerment may interact and be mutually
reinforcing, such that the whole of deliberative success is more than the sum of its parts, not all
of which can be neatly and easily separated. For example, we found in this study that
information acquisition cannot be easily separated from deliberation itself. Instead, the
community panel discovered new information and perspectives throughout the conference,
including during the final weekend when they deliberated as a group and finalized their
recommendations.
One thing is clear: research that simply demonstrates that deliberation fails to reach ideal
standards is less useful than studies that illuminate when, how, and why deliberation might
achieve greater equity and quality. Along these lines, we suggest comparative research on new
civic forums with and without enclaves of the dispossessed. Another strand of comparative work
might assess whether our enthusiasm for civic forums as venues for enclave deliberation would
be better invested elsewhere. This research could examine the extent that deliberation in forums
of disempowered people satisfies criteria of equity and quality compared with other political
arenas open to them. Do civic forums offer better prospects for discussion among those who
hold different views in ways that lead to empowered participation compared with discussion in
informal social networks, where talk with political opposites can lead to dispirited withdrawal
from politics?90 Might civic forums provide better possibilities for the least powerful to discover
and express collective interests than in some social movement organizations that have become
managed by distant professionals, hierarchical, and focused on single issues?91 Could civic
forums inform and interact with deliberation within other movements, such as the global justice
movement, revitalizing earlier forms of popular discussion in the interests of leadership
accountability, political education and mobilization?92 Could civic forums allow the deliberation
of the disempowered to exercise more influence than at typical public hearings, which are often
designed in ways that make it especially difficult for disempowered groups to contribute
meaningfully to the decision-making process?93 If so, forums with enclaves of the marginalized
might deserve a third cheer.
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Table 1. Community Panel and Control Panel Characteristics
Community
Panel (n=12)

Control
Panel (n=15)

Household Income
Below median
Below 50% of area median

92% (11)
50% (6)

100% (15)
60% (9)

Education
High school graduate or less
Technical school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Post-graduate or professional degree

8% (1)
16% (2)
16% (2)
50% (6)
8% (1)

7% (1)
7% (1)
47% (7)
27% (4)
13% (2)

Race/Ethnicity
African-American
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
White
Other

25% (3)
33% (4)
25% (3)
25% (3)
12% (1)

33% (5)
27% (4)
20% (3)
20% (3)
0% (0)

Age
60 years or older
31-59 years
Under 30 years

25% (3)
50% (6)
25% (3)

20% (3)
40% (6)
20% (3)

Gender
Female
Male

58% (7)
42% (5)

60% (9)
40% (6)

Physical Disability

25% (3)

27% (4)

Rural resident

8% (1)

8% (1)

Home broadband access

58% (7)

86% (13)

Notes: Area median income was $87,400 for the four counties of Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, Alameda, and San Mateo,
California. Some respondents identified with more than one racial/ethnic category. Some percentages may not total
100 percent because of rounding.
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Table 2. Impressions of Community Panelists’ Knowledge of the Issues
Community Panelists’ Impressions
Question

Weekend 1
Mean

Weekend 2
Mean

Weekend 3
Mean

The conference organizers provided sufficient
information to enable the community panelists to
make informed policy recommendations

1.5
(.82)

1.4
(.79)

1.3
(.45)

I learned new information about the issue of broadband
access that I did not know before this weekend

1.2
(.40)

1.1
(.29)

1.5
(1.17)

This weekend’s community panel discussions are
helping me see new perspectives I had not considered
before

1.3
(.47)

1.5
(.67)

1.4
(.90)

I do not yet understand enough to make a good
recommendation about municipal broadband policy

3.0
(1.13)

3.3
(1.38)

4.7
(.89)

Experts’ Impressions
Questions

Post-Conference Evaluation

The consensus conference provided sufficient
information to enable the community panelists to
make informed policy recommendations.

1.71
(.29)

Questions and comments from community panelists
[at the public hearing] showed that they understood
well the important issues related to municipal broadband.

1.50
(.29)

The community panel's recommendations show that the
panelists understood well the basic issues surrounding
municipal broadband.

1.43
(.20)

Note: All responses are on a 1-5 scale, with 1 meaning “Strongly Agree” and 5 meaning “Strongly
Disagree”, Standard Deviation in parentheses.
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Figure 5a

Figure 5b
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Table 3. Community Panelists’ Views of the Quality of Deliberation
Question

Weekend 1
Mean

Weekend 2
Mean

Weekend 3
Mean

All different perspectives about municipal
broadband were welcome during the group discussions

1.5
(.82)

1.3
(.65)

1.5
(1.00)

The community panelists carefully considered all
sides of the issue

1.5
(.68)

1.8
(1.03)

1.5
(.80)

Some important perspectives or ideas about municipal
broadband were not adequately considered or discussed

3.5
(1.37)

3.3
(1.30)

3.9
(1.44)

Community panelists respected each other’s ideas,
even if they disagreed about some important issues

1.5
(.82)

1.4
(.51)

1.4
(.79)

The group discussions this weekend made me
uncomfortable because there was so much disagreement

4.9
(.30)

4.6
(.79)

4.4
(1.24)

Note: All responses are on a 1-5 scale, with 1 meaning “Strongly Agree” and 5 meaning “Strongly
Disagree.” Standard Deviation in parentheses.
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Table 4. Expert Views of the Consensus Conference
Expert and
Advisory Panel

Follow-Up Event
Participants

Public Hearing
Experts who testified at the public hearing
represented a broad range of views.

1.50

At the public hearing, all different perspectives
about municipal broadband were treated fairly.

1.25

(.29)

(.25)

Impact
The consensus conference will have an impact on
public policy decisions about municipal
broadband.

2.14
(.26)

The conference will affect the thinking of
stakeholders in the municipal broadband issue.

2.00
(.44)

The community panels' recommendations are
likely to be opposed by important stakeholders or
interests.

2.29
(.57)

Panel Recommendations
Some of my preferred issues and ideas did not
make it into the community panel's
recommendations.

3.14
(.46)

The community panels' recommendations are not
realistic.

4.43

I fully support all of the community panel's
recommendations.

2.00

1.54

(.22)

(.18)

7

13

(.30)

N

All responses scored on a 1-5 scale, with 1="Strongly Agree" and 5="Strongly Disagree"
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